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Abstract
The recent London Infrastructure Plan 2050 appears as an attempt for com-
ing up with innovative answers to infrastructure issues, aiming at providing 
new spaces where different actors can collaborate, defining adequate vi-
sions and governance bodies. Our hypothesis is that the plan can be inter-
preted through the relevant and yet ambiguous concept of ‘trading zone’, 
which highlights the setting up of new spaces for confrontation but also 
shows their use as political vehicles to advocate for increased powers and 
resources. To investigate the issue, the paper reviews the literature on the 
concept of trading zone in order to discuss in this perspective the London 
Infrastructure Plan planning process. The analysis is developed as follows: 
after a theoretical discussion of trading zones and their relationship with 
infrastructure planning processes, two significant aspects of the London 
Infrastructure Plan are examined: the stakeholders’ engagement required 
by strategic planning processes, and the ongoing planning processes of 
London, influenced by the Localism agenda. Consequently, the London In-
frastructure Plan 2050 is described and reviewed in the light of its political 
strategic meaning, providing a discussion of its vision, contents and plan-
ning process. The analysis uses and rediscusses the concept of trading 
zone by observing how local authorities may use planning processes to 
strategically position themselves and influence the complex governance of 
infrastructure planning.
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planning; urban politics
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1. Introduction
In an increasingly connected economy, the networks and infrastruc-
tures’ contribution to local economic development can be considered a 
mantra in regional and urban strategic policy-making (Flyvbjerg, 2005). 
Networks and infrastructures influence resilience of urban systems 
(Wilkinson, 2012; Crawford & Davoudi, 2009) and they have strong im-
plications on governance schemes and institutional arrangements (Cas-
tells, 1996). In this paper we discuss an arguable infrastructure strategic 
planning practice, showing the possible contradictions emerging from 
the decision making and stakeholders’ engagement processes and tech-
nical, political and organizational outcomes. In our view this is a direct 
effect of infrastructures’ strategic power in connecting material and im-
material urban elements - from people to objects and information (Han-
nam et al, 2006), being crucial drivers of urban growth and determiners 
on future trajectories of city developments. 
Infrastructures bring together multiple subjects and territorial levels: 
they cross multiple scales, from the local to the supranational (Jensen 
& Richardson, 2004); they affect differently diverse settings and groups 
(Graham & Marvin, 2001); they also involve a number of actors repre-
senting different interests in various arenas (Bobbio & Dansero, 2008). 
For instance, infrastructures such as those for electricity or water provi-
sion often remain largely outside the control of metropolitan authori-
ties, under the supervision of national regulators and large private com-
panies (service providers, producers, network developers) who in return 
are paying little attention to local urban development strategies and ini-
tiatives. In this way, global connections often determine local (dis)con-
nections (Graham & Marvin, 2001). It is therefore crucial for cities to 
develop long-term visions and adequate governance bodies that would 
enable them to define and implement coherent strategies on infrastruc-
tures, promoting both growth and resilience. 
The recent London Infrastructure Plan 2050 (LIP 2050) provides a 
significant example of such an effort, at least in its rhetoric. London’s de-
cision-makers focus on infrastructures as key elements to foster devel-
opment, arguing that global cities require a peculiar, tailor-made form 
of governance that would give them the flexibility and authority required 
to answer the specific challenges they are confronted with. Through the 
analysis of the 2050 London Infrastructures Plan’s we discuss whether 
this particular piece of urban infrastructure planning is framed in terms 
of coping with these emerging issues or as a political strategy. From our 
perspective, this planning effort seems to be taking place mostly outside 
the statutory planning scheme, coupled with an effort of out-of-the-box 
stakeholders’ inclusiveness in order to establish opportunities of con-
frontation with the institutions currently in charge of infrastructures 
planning. This process is gathered in the LIP 2050 report and material-
ised by the creation of a new body, the London Infrastructure Delivery 
Board (LIDB). In the paper we thus discuss the strategic nature of the 
LIP 2050 interpreting it as the occasion to create a ‘trading zone’ (Gali-
son, 1999), that is to say a space of confrontation where to gather the 
many stakeholders active in the field of infrastructures. 
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Our hypothesis is that the former Mayor of London Boris Johnson, 
who promoted the LIP 2050, has been using this cross-sectorial stra-
tegic project not only for creating a trading zone between actors and 
unlocking actions, but rather to position his administration at the stake-
holders’ table and lobby for increased powers and resources. This pro-
cess would ultimately allow the Mayor of London to gather under his 
supervision scattered competencies and gain control over his own devel-
opment, an interpretation based on the ongoing development of London 
and on the specific local inflections of the British planning system. To 
explore this hypothesis, the paper discusses the background of LIP 2050 
from two theoretical perspectives. The first section provides an interpre-
tation that relates infrastructure planning to the construction of trad-
ing zones (section 2). The second one describes the London playground, 
considering the peculiarities of the UK planning system and the possible 
meanings assumed by London strategic vision of infrastructure devel-
opment (section 3). Then, the LIP 2050 is discussed in the light of its 
strategic meaning in both analytical and policy perspective, focusing on 
its vision on the interactions between stakeholders and on the planning 
results (section 4). It focuses on energy and water supply, new fields of 
action for the Greater London Authority (GLA). Finally, conclusive re-
marks provide a discussion of the LIP 2050 as a strategic move (section 
5) as well as of the trading zone concept that frames its interpretation 
(section 6).
In order to understand the different political implications and posi-
tions this paper has been developed mainly through the literature review 
on the strategic planning field and of different policy documents related 
to the LIP planning process, including several newspapers’ articles. In 
particular, an overview of the London Infrastructure Plan 2050 is pro-
vided by summarising its features and interpreting them in the light of 
the trading zone concept; taking into account three main elements: the 
vision put forward, the planning process that led its establishment, and 
the contents of the plan.
2. Spaces of engagement and trading zones in 
infrastructure planning processes 
From a governance perspective, infrastructures are relevant, and even 
major, items, characterised by a strategic nature (Offner, 2000). They 
provide the necessary support for manifold urban practices and may 
also act as tools for strategies, referred to specific stakeholders and a 
larger spectrum of players. Observing the LIP case, the infrastructure 
planning process seem to follow a pattern similar to many large scale 
projects (Pinson, 2009). Therefore, this large infrastructure plan seems 
to represent a tool for their initiators to recompose local governance and 
reshuffle the cards of the different players, sometimes even leading to 
a significant redistribution of powers and competences. These mecha-
nisms can work at different levels, since networked spaces across all in-
frastructural sectors are being constructed, legitimised and maintained 
– politically, socio-technically, legally and geographically – in different 
ways (Graham, 2000). But the greater challenge perhaps is to under-
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stand how intertwined networked spaces fit more broadly into what 
Harvey (1996, p. 260-261) called the ‘co-gredience’ of contemporary 
metropolitan life – “the way in which multiple processes flow together 
to construct a single consistent, coherent, though multi-faceted time-
space system”. By nature transversal, infrastructures challenge insti-
tutions and boundaries already questioned by globalization forces and 
pressures as identified by Sassen (2006): these are particularly sensible 
in a ‘global city’ such as London, where they seem to originate a peculiar 
path, different from other European experiences. 
In terms of strategic choices, the current European frameworks for 
transport and energy issues (EU Commission, 2011; EU Commission, 
2014) see these as interrelated fields where to intervene in order to guar-
antee a sustainable future, focusing on the environmental externalities 
produced by the mobility and energy industries. A predominant environ-
mental concern influences the inspiring principles of these documents, 
as well as their planning reflections (as demonstrated for example by 
the European-driven Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans; see Wefering et 
al, 2014): in particular, actions in the domains of technology, economy 
and finance, and regulation and planning are favoured (Banister, 2010). 
While this articulation of actions is somehow part of a mainstream ap-
proach to the issues of sustainable development (Arsenio et al, 2016) 
and can be found also in London, different is the underlying rationale 
that inspires them.
Even when facing infrastructural issues, the UK and London1 seem 
to overlook the European focus on sustainable development (with its 
environmental emphasis) and to privilege the promotion of economic 
growth. At the national level, the prevailing planning attitude “contin-
ues to avoid any spatialized approach to the infrastructure field, except 
that which continues to go on within the relevant companies and bod-
ies which plan for their own particular fields” (Marshall, 2014, p. 24). 
London instead focuses on its own development and already shows the 
highest concentration of business activities in England (21%): their vol-
ume and density are far greater than anywhere else, with a dispropor-
tionate development in comparison to other English regions (Berry et al, 
2015). Similarly, London receives the highest amount of planned public 
investments for infrastructure, as the National Infrastructure Pipeline 
shows (Infrastructure UK & HM Treasury, 2015). The 22% of national 
investment on infrastructures is directly attributable to London, with-
out considering projects like the proposed Crossrail 2 rail line and the 
expansion of Heathrow Airport. These figures show a potential conflict 
between London and the National Government. While infrastructures 
are crucial for the further development of a global city, the government 
has already claimed the need to reduce (public) investments in London 
in order to increase investment in other British regions, especially in the 
North: “the powerhouse of London dominates more and more”, as the 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer stated (Osborne, 2014).
This conflictual dimension of infrastructure planning processes has 
much in common with similar European dynamics, where the confron-
tation of subjects and interests active around infrastructures encom-
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passes different dimensions: policy and its fragmentation, competition 
between different objectives, uneven distribution of resources and ben-
efits. Different are instead the government tiers involved in the confron-
tation. For example, the protests around a planned high-speed railway 
line in the Italian Val di Susa – part of the Ten-T Mediterranean cor-
ridor – directly challenged community infrastructure strategies and the 
national governments in charge of their implementation. Instead, the 
British case seems to convey more a national dimension of conflicts, also 
due to its relatively marginal position within European infrastructural 
strategies: Great Britain is crossed by the Ten-T North Sea-Mediterra-
nean corridor, but its main component affecting England – the Channel 
Tunnel – is already existing and actually is presented as a success story 
to justify the implementation of the whole corridor (EU Commission, 
2016). 
The mainly national dimension of British infrastructure-related con-
flicts between local and national governments seem well conveyed by the 
tormented history of London Heathrow airport, an emblematic example 
of how conflicts strongly influence the development of infrastructures 
and to some extent even question the possible effectiveness and neutral-
ity of infrastructure planning. Heathrow’s replacement (discussed since 
the 1970s) and its expansion with a third runway (currently debated) 
have activated multiple confrontations between government, local au-
thorities (including London, due to its particular interest in the matter), 
thematic committees and technical authorities. But the political inter-
est has been captured mainly by the local community of the Richmond 
area, strongly exposed to the externalities of the airport and its expan-
sion project.2 Recently, the endurance of the new cabinet led by Theresa 
May has been questioned due to the contradictory opinions on the very 
matter expressed by some of its most prominent members. Conflictual 
dynamics thus can effectively affect infrastructure proposals and hinder 
their implementation; it is for these reasons that, already in the 1980s, 
Hall (1982) included the Heathrow case in his collection of ‘great plan-
ning disasters’. 
The concept of trading zone seems to capture well the strategic na-
ture of infrastructures governance and their planning processes. In this 
contribution we want to show that the concept can be used both as an 
analytical and normative approach in urban planning practices, when 
applied with due attention to different aspects of complexity. Here we 
will focus on the former, since an increasing number of policies and 
planning processes seems to follow its footsteps. From a normative 
standpoint, we consider that the overlapping of numerous fields, stake-
holders and territorial scales, obvious in the very case of London, sug-
gests that the development of a dedicated plan – such as the LIP 2050 
– becomes a privileged occasion to confront different visions on the 
same issues. We propose thus to analyse the LIP 2050 as an attempt to 
create a space of engagement, definable as ‘trading zone’: it represents a 
context in which, “despite the differences in classification, significance, 
and standards of demonstration, two groups can collaborate” (Galison, 
1999, p. 146). From a planning perspective, the relevance of the concept 
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roots backs to the works of Lindblom (1959) and Simon (1955). Both ex-
posed the insufficiencies of the rational approach to planning, because 
of the fragmentation of stakeholders (Lindblom, 1959) and imperfect in-
formation leading to limited rationality (Simon, 1955). Lindblom (1959) 
therefore coined planning as primarily a process of ‘muddling through’ 
difficulties, leading to partisan mutual adjustment between actors. This 
process, based on bargaining and compromise-seeking, could be re-in-
terpreted as the creation of a local trading zone (Mäntysalo et al., 2011). 
The literature on trading zones has usually framed the concept as a 
tool for communication and coordination, contributing to the constitu-
tion of public arenas around public problems (Fedeli, 2013), offering 
the possibility to actors with conflicting views to go beyond their issues 
and avoid the trap of inaction. This seems to be the case for planning 
processes devoted to infrastructures, defining strategies for “the crea-
tion of partial agreements even among actors with different objectives 
and values” (Balducci, 2011, p. 536). In this way, it may be possible to 
address the current deficit of democracy in planning processes, allow-
ing actors to coproduce and reframe the State–citizen relationship and 
the equal partnership between actors involved in the strategic planning 
process (Albrechts, 2013).
The trading zone concept may be a fruitful analytical approach when 
applied to infrastructure related issues. This has been noticed for in-
frastructures-related conflicts (Pucci, 2015), where it is easy to identify 
the stakeholders “to be mediated with and to engage in the generation 
of a shared trading zone” (Mäntysalo & Balducci, 2013, p. 190). In this 
sense, infrastructure plans and their development processes appear as 
potential trading zones. 
Construction and management of infrastructures involve subjects 
who pursue different aims at different territorial levels: plans, interven-
ing in given settings, may define the local as a space of engagement for 
actors, allowing even agonistic forms of trading (Mäntysalo et al., 2011). 
Through trading zones, planning becomes the intentional attempt to ob-
tain “not the progressive persuasion of the actors about common goals 
to produce the right choices, but the creation of an area of understand-
ing, exchange and translation between actors to produce partial agree-
ments and innovations” (Balducci, 2015, p. 6). In this respect, in stra-
tegic planning practices of multi-actor collaboration it is also relevant 
to verify “the critical step related to the opening up of consensus-based 
governance networks more widely, to cover diverse interests not only 
related to economic but also social and environmental issues” (Kalli-
omäki, 2015, p. 114).
However, the nature of trading zones is not necessarily neutral. The 
establishment of an infrastructure planning process that gathers dif-
ferent actors around transversal planning issues, with high technical 
constraints and implying long-term visions, could be part of an actor’s 
wider strategy to establish its own position within a specific planning 
field. This ambiguous nature of trading zones, which may contribute to 
specific strategies rather than simply setting spaces for confrontation 
and agreement, frames our interpretation of the LIP 2050. The plan ap-
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pears in fact as an occasion created by the Mayor of London to initiate a 
planning process and guarantee himself a dominant position by struc-
turing a space of engagement for the different actors involved in London 
infrastructural developments.
3. Localism agenda and strategic planning in 
London
In analysing the United Kingdom context, it is necessary to consider the 
process of network infrastructures privatisation from the early 1980s 
(involving for example mobility, telecommunications, water and energy 
supply; see Pollit, 2002). Following a neoliberal public management 
strategy, the role of the State virtually ceased in infrastructure provi-
sion. According to the concept that Nozick (1974) defined as ‘minimum 
State’, public provision is maintained only for the essential services such 
as health, education, and the services of administration of taxation and 
social security. While the State maintains a direct presence in road main-
tenance, its current role is mainly to mediate contracts with the privat-
ized infrastructure companies (Helm, 2009). The State defines the roles 
of the parties, and it sets the powers and duties of regulators, bestowing 
much of the planning function to the local authorities. As it is often the 
case for infrastructures, physical networks, operators and regulators are 
intertwined in non-matching scales, creating a complex and uneven en-
vironment.3 Regulation is dealt with at the national level, with autono-
mous bodies such as the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 
and the Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT), and the cor-
responding governmental departments (energy, environment). At the 
local level, boroughs and GLA share planning competencies, which have 
largely been redefined by the 2011 Localism Act (see below) and interact 
with infrastructure development plans although they do not have hier-
archical relationships.
 
The Localism Act and its consequences on London planning
The first two years after the Coalition Government had taken office have 
been a period of rapid change in the framework for territorial planning 
and policies in England. The Localism Act became law in November 
2011. In March 2012, the Government published the final version of 
the National Planning Policy Framework, which replaced all previous 
Government planning policy guidance. In July 2011, the then Mayor of 
London, Boris Johnson, published the London Plan, revising the spa-
tial development strategy for London originally published by the for-
mer Mayor Livingstone in February 2004. The Mayor has consequently 
initiated a consultation on further changes to the London Plan, while 
Ministers have launched a further round of planning ‘deregulation’. 
The Localism Act enacted the abolition of Regional Spatial Strategies 
for English regions outside London. Regional Assemblies, the bodies re-
sponsible for drafting Regional Spatial Strategies under the 2004 Plan-
ning and Compulsory Purchase Act, were abolished together with the 
Regional Development Agencies and other structures of regional gov-
ernment such as the Regional Leadership Boards. 
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The impact of the Localism Act and this political shift is still being 
highly debated also in academia. A recent contribution, edited by Mada-
nipour and Davoudi (2015), offers a collection of reflections and insights 
on the matter, gathered around the quite explicit title ‘Reconsidering 
Localism’. Contributing to this collective book, Cowell (2015) reckoned 
that the localist agenda, as implemented by the UK government in the 
last few years, primarily resulted into a restriction of local public action 
rather than a multiplication of projects and initiatives. Actually, even if 
it improved the ‘negative freedom’ of local strategic planning actions, 
the national context of budget cuts led government to use it to reduce 
their perimeter rather than expanding it. In this context, London was 
however an exception. 
The Mayor of London’s strategic planning powers derived from the 
Greater London Authority Act (1999), with the powers extended in the 
Greater London Authority Act (2007). The Mayor of London became 
responsible for a Spatial Development Strategy for London (commonly 
known as the London Plan) and received powers to direct local plan-
ning authorities (LPAs) to refuse applications for strategic schemes that 
did not comply with the Spatial Development Strategy. The 2008 Act 
extended the Mayor’s competencies to include the responsibility for the 
London Housing Strategy, which had previously been the responsibility 
of central government and strategic development applications from the 
LPA. In April 2012, the Mayor took over the responsibility of the London 
region from the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), which was the 
main central government agency for funding new affordable housing, 
with the London HCA budget being transferred to the Mayor’s control. 
The Localism Act abolished the London Development Agency, with its 
functions incorporated into the Greater London Authority structure. 
The Localism Act also gave the Mayor the power to set up Mayoral De-
velopment Corporations (MDC) in areas requiring regeneration, with 
the first MDC now established as the Olympic Legacy Development Cor-
poration. The Localism Act established Neighbourhood Forums as well, 
related to a new tier of legally binding planning. 
In summary London’s regional government appears to having been 
strengthened in contrast with the rest of England. The Coalition Govern-
ment’s argument for this apparent anomaly is that the Mayor of London, 
unlike regional assemblies outside London, is directly elected. London 
remains the only locality to have a regional plan (the London Plan), but 
the effectiveness of its presence is questioned by issues of complexity 
and inadequacy. As for the first issue, the legislation does not simplify 
the planning process, since an additional tier has been added. In this 
way, “in London, for example, there could be (…): the London Plan, the 
Borough Local Plan and the Neighborhood Plan. Since all are required 
to be in general conformity with the higher tier, there are many oppor-
tunities for inconsistencies and questions of priority to creep in” (Bailey, 
2014, p. 13). As for inadequacy, the issue is highlighted from an almost 
opposite point of view. The ongoing growth of London, characterised by 
the internationalisation of its job market, the increased housing demand 
and the consequent price inflation, cannot be accomplished within the 
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sole Greater London Authority and may require a wider perspective to 
be strategically tackled (Bowie, 2014).
Moreover, the process of approval of these plans has been modified, 
leaving GLA with little power over infrastructure development orienta-
tions. Actually, the public inquiry must now make sure that the plan is 
in accordance with the capacity and strategy of infrastructure and utility 
providers before adopting it. This new inclusion in the definition of the 
plan soundness, while augmenting its feasibility, automatically reduced 
the lobbying power of local authorities over utility companies. 
In a sense, this process seems to have underestimate the objective 
of establishing a potential trading zone as a new space of confrontation 
between actors. In fact, the reduced space for interaction have dimin-
ished the opportunities of confrontation – even conflictual – between 
the involved subjects. In fact, actors appear to rather be moving towards 
different directions, as the next section discusses.
4. London Infrastructure Plan 2050: an overview
Setting up the vision
A progress report of the infrastructure plan team, released in March 
2014, was the first document that appeared in public. In the introduction 
of that document, Boris Johnson intends to demonstrate the large sup-
port already present around his vision for the development of London: 
to do so, he explicitly connects the previous work of a committee formed 
by London Councils, the Boroughs and the London Enterprise Panel to 
his 2020 vision, set out in June 2013 in the aftermath of the 2012 Olym-
pics (MoL, 2014a). The Mayor’s 2020 Vision sets out the critical infra-
structure required on the road to 2020 and beyond. The London Plan 
sets out London’s needs to 2036, but it is currently undergoing further 
alterations due to a full statutory review, taking into account scenarios 
and suggestions developed in the LIP 2050. 
The vision of LIP 2050 is summarised in the idea that “with the right 
infrastructure in place we can create a city where everyone’s quality of 
life improves” (MoL, 2015a, p. 7). The vision is quite generic and bases 
this improvement on the exploitation of different infrastructures and 
technologies, as a tool towards environmental, social and economic 
sustainability. Each of these features is briefly explained, defining for 
every field (transport, energy, water, communication…) generic targets 
that only in a following section of the document have quantitative and 
temporal specifications. The overall idea of the plan is summarised in a 
sentence originally referred to the transport sector, stating the relevance 
of “ensuring the foundations for London’s continued global success” 
(MoL, 2015b, p. 19): the LIP 2050 aims at sustaining the ongoing devel-
opment process of the city, improving the equipment that reinforce the 
attractiveness of London. The plan is thus part of a strategy intended to 
maintain the global position of London. 
The simplicity of LIP 2050’s vision seems to be in line with the idea 
that the positive image of the city is based on those infrastructures and 
services attracting investors and visitors (Castells & Borja, 1996), as well 
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as it reflects the fact that “if a strategy has enduring power, it cannot 
avoid ‘reductive effects’ on future ways of understanding and acting. 
Spatial strategy making involves exercising the power to select and sim-
plify” (Healey, 2009, p. 445). The simple vision of LIP 2050 fits into the 
idea that “visions and images for the future help in finding a way but at 
the same time produce new frameworks for action and redefine social 
and economic limits and political and administrative boundaries. The 
visionary and story-telling dimensions of planning are in this respect 
central” (Sartorio, 2005, p. 13), even if in this case the story told is sim-
ply an ongoing one. At least, differently from other cases, the simple 
vision is deeply rooted in the setting and the story of London, instead of 
being carried by the ‘transnational flow of planning ideas and practices’ 
(Healey, 2013). 
In putting forward its vision for London, the LIP 2050 relies more 
on textual descriptions rather than on visual imageries. Cartographic 
representations of the strategies proposed in the plan are absent from 
the key documents, being available only in public presentations and 
supporting papers. As already done by the 2011 London Plan4 the LIP 
2050 provides a few schematic diagrams, intended to represent loose 
spatial strategies around which the consensus of manifold actors may 
be aroused more easily. Contrary to the London Plan, the LIP 2050 does 
not provide precise locations for interventions, but rather suggests the 
wider strategical schemes that may host such interventions. Moreover, 
the LIP 2050 only provides suggestive schemes, which appear as the 
complement of a strategy expressed with words rather than as a central 
element of the vision for London and its infrastructure. The plan reaf-
firms the idea of enablement and offers what could be defined as ‘car-
tography of opportunity’, in which schemes contribute to the creation of 
a trading zone by showing those elements that may originate manifold 
new initiatives (be them referred to coping with urgent issues, such as 
energy production, or to the creation of new relationships and connec-
tions at the national and the international scale) but without associating 
them too strictly to any specific location. 
As for the choice of the 2050 temporal horizon, it derived from the 
literature review conducted from other cities that are undertaking long 
term infrastructure planning, considering that New York and Tokyo are 
planning to 2050, with New York going further and starting to look at 
2100 (MoL, 2015b). In many cases, the plans are focused on addressing 
a particular issue: for example, Auckland’s 30-year infrastructure plan 
concentrates on the infrastructure required to reduce congestion. It ap-
pears that London is somewhat unique in looking across infrastructure 
types, assessing costs and including plans for funding and financing. 
This transversal attitude may call for inedited, devoted spaces of con-
frontation such as those provided by trading zones, even if this consider-
ably widens the range of relevant actors and consequently the complex-
ity of decisional arenas, potentially reducing their effectiveness. The LIP 
2050 aims to keep London developing, improving the infrastructures 
that can contribute to this purpose. With this first document, the May-
or thus illustrated the long-term nature of infrastructure planning, the 
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next set of investments needed to be drawn up if London is to sustain 
and accommodate its growth for the rest of the first half of this century. 
The focus on infrastructure and their long-term development stems 
from London Finance Commission (LFC, 2013), which made a number 
of recommendations to improve funding arrangements for London’s 
government, primarily in order to meet the city’s growing infrastruc-
ture needs. It argued that as data on the investment needs for the city 
are contained separately in many documents and that costs are often 
not properly understood, a more comprehensive assessment is required 
for London. Specifically, it recommended that the Mayor, working with 
London Councils, the boroughs and the London Enterprise Panel (LEP), 
should develop and maintain a long-term, high-level capital investment 
plan for the city. This should set out the costs of strategic investment 
options and match them to the resources available both now and in a fu-
ture (maybe more decentralised) situation. The Mayor endorsed all the 
recommendations of the London Finance Commission and recognized 
the value in London’s metropolitan government playing a more cen-
tral role in planning for its infrastructure provision. The infrastructure 
planning process was commissioned in summer 2013. The LEP and its 
infrastructure subgroup, the London Infrastructure Group (LIG), pro-
vided strategic oversight for the program. They have been instrumental 
in setting the scope and approach; and providing guidance on emerging 
findings. An External Advisory Group was set up in September 2013 to 
provide further guidance and expertise. 
The vision of LIP 2050 already seems to contribute to the establish-
ment of a trading zone, where different actors may gather and confront 
their interests. The plan in fact puts forward a vision that is quite gener-
ic, whose few established features define an attractive scenario – “Lon-
don’s continued global success” (MoL, 2015b, p. 19) – that is already 
known and to which any subject potentially may want to take part. In-
strumental in this sense is the adoption of a long-term perspective and 
the refusal of any strict spatial inflection of the LIP 2050’s vision, in 
order to keep options open and expand the space of confrontation avail-
able to the many infrastructure-related actors.
Consultations, actors and interactions
In October 2013, a debate on infrastructures was held at City Hall. Ex-
perts on the panel discussed their own views on infrastructure challeng-
es, including how forward planning could be improved and considering 
funding and financing issues. The audience, who came from business, 
government and academia, was invited to contribute to the discussion. 
This event helped guide the internal deliberations at a relatively early 
stage. In late November 2013, the London Assembly Planning Commit-
tee held a session on the Long Term Infrastructure Investment Plan. In 
July 2014, the Mayor launched the infrastructure plan consultation as a 
subsequence of the vision document (MoL, 2014b). 
The consultation lasted three months and in total 272 people re-
sponded to the LIP 2050 consultation (Steer Davies Gleave, 2015). 
This included 114 responses from individuals (41%), 30 responses from 
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London boroughs (11%), 28 responses from local authorities outside 
London (10%), 31 responses from businesses (11%) and 72 other organ-
isations (27 %). Their responses focused on improving existing infra-
structures (especially implementing technological innovations), using 
varied forms of funding (attracting private investments and investing 
locally a higher share of local taxes) and reducing the imbalances be-
tween different areas of the city as well as with the settlements border-
ing London. In particular, final key recommendations focused on three 
measures: prioritisation of south London infrastructure, coordination 
with local authorities outside London, and Thames Estuary airport. Af-
ter the consultation, the Mayor established the London Infrastructure 
Delivery Board to collectively take the lead in improving delivery of Lon-
don’s infrastructure. London Mayor Cabinet involved in the strategy de-
sign process those actors they considered as crucial in order to allow 
sufficient investments in infrastructure. They are: subjects responsible 
for delivery and provision of infrastructures and services; local policy 
makers; national policy makers, entrepreneurs and professionals’ coali-
tions; private corporations involved in infrastructures management and 
investments; regulators.
Noticeably, GLA’s Planning team appears to be quite absent from the 
different steps of the process, contrary to consultancies, such as the one 
listed under the role ‘advisor consultancies’. These advisors are the UK 
major consultancy companies involved in different advisory activities, 
concerning general public sector, constructions and infrastructure de-
velopment, asset and facility management. These companies are already 
involved in several developments on London urban areas. The role of 
these actors is considered essentially strategic in order to gather the key 
private investments that have allowed the major transformations oc-
curred in London in the last few years. While the vision (2020) shaped 
the global understanding of the city’s development, it seems that the 
London Finance Commission (LFC, 2014, p. 5) has actually shaped the 
reflection. A large space was open to private actors of the domain, being 
they utilities or developers. Consultancy firms were also present at each 
step and represented in every decision or consultation body. The plan-
ning process appears thus to have a trading zone. However, this con-
frontational space is one characterised by an exhibited openness, which 
nonetheless privileges private actors already active in different develop-
ment projects in London. This aspect may be interpreted as a further 
expression of the former Mayor’s interest in showing his support to the 
ongoing growth of London, as well as to the actors that are participating 
in the process. 
 
Planning results: 
a framework of London Infrastructure Plan contents
The process resulted in the adoption of a document, the LIP 2050, and 
in the creation of the London Infrastructure Delivery Board. The LIP 
2050 provides planning guidelines that also orientate a full statutory re-
view of the London Plan started in 2015, according to GLA’s perspective 
and expectation on infrastructure developments. This loosely structured 
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process is described in the plan as: “The illustrative scenarios we have 
developed about how London’s growing population could be accommo-
dated in the longer term (within London and beyond its boundaries) will 
serve as a starting point for the London Plan’s further consideration of 
growth distribution in and around the city” (MoL, 2015b, p. 45). The LIP 
2050 moves from a long-term vision defining London’s infrastructural 
requirements, outlines sector-specific progresses and needs, and finally 
discusses priorities and timing for the implementation of the plan. The 
vision focuses on the support of London’s growth and how to face its 
most pressing matters, housing and infrastructures. Consequently, the 
plan estimates a number of cross-cutting and specific infrastructural 
needs across the city in a 2050 temporal horizon: an additional 1.5 mil-
lion homes, a 20% increase in energy supply capacity, approximately 
£1 billion of healthcare investments over the next 5 years, around 50% 
of increase in public transport capacity, high speed digital connectivity, 
around 600 more schools and colleges, around 40 new facilities that will 
be used for recycling, remanufacturing, reusing and waste management, 
an extra 9000ha of accessible green space including 10% more green 
cover in central London, the Thames Tideway Tunnel and other water 
infrastructure.
For each sector of intervention, the plan aims to improve service 
provisions in areas with low levels of coverage. This improvement in 
required according to the will of pursuing the ambitious target of pro-
Figure 1: Scheme for Cross-
rail2 (source MoL, 2015b).
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viding businesses and residents the connectivity needed wherever they 
are located, as soon as they need it, at competitive prices (MoL, 2015b). 
To do so, the few spatial schemes put forward the sector-specific meas-
ures emphasising the suggestive names of the areas where interventions 
will land (Figure 1), or providing even more vague development lines re-
ferred to the directions that will be involved in the interventions (Figure 
2). In this perspective, both public transport and digital connectivity are 
crucial. To intervene on London’s public transports and opening to re-
generation opportunities, major infrastructural network enhancements 
have been programmed as central interventions in LIP 2050 scenario; in 
particular, these include the delivery of Crossrail 2 (Figure 1), and plans 
for cycling and walking (Figure 2). For digital connectivity, the Mayor 
has set up a Connectivity Advisory Group (CAG) and a comprehensive 
work program to boost the virtual connection of some areas of the city.
Energy and water are central as well, given their enabling role for 
the overall growth of London. The overarching objective is to ensure 
that London’s energy infrastructure is developed in a way that delivers 
security and reliability of supply; affordability and cost-competitiveness 
of energy; and an 80% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 
in line with Mayoral and national government policy. National policy 
is leading to electrification of heating and transport, while the promo-
tion of local energy production is intended to reduce energy costs and 
increase both resilience and efficiency. The plan proposes an energy 
strategy based on the analysis of energy supply and demand and associ-
ated infrastructure needs across the city, encouraging locally produced 
energy. Its spatial  dimension (see Figure 3) suggests the idea of a “gen-
eralized” strategy distributed across the city, which makes it potentially 
attractive for many different actors. In order to set up integrated water 
Figure 2: Plans for cycling and 
walking (source MoL, 2015b).
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management the plan has brought together the Water Advisory Group 
to ensure that the London Infrastructure Delivery Board receives the 
best advice on water-related issues. Despite the generic contents of the 
plan, the strategy is intended to foster an integrated water management 
framework across London and specific delivery areas, and to actively 
seek synergies with other utilities, housing and transport projects.
The overview of the LIP 2050 shows that the plan provides a gen-
eral framework for London infrastructures in the next decades, drawing 
on guidelines reflecting the mayoral strategy and trying to gather most 
actors around a generic and yet desirable vision for the city’s develop-
ment. The unilaterality of the document is however limited by the quite 
open (although not always successful) consultation realised, as well as 
the early involvement of the sectors’ key players. The Board is for now 
mainly a discussion and coordination arena, interpretable as an attempt 
of establishing a trading zone able to speed up the dialogue and enabling 
fast conflict resolution for more rapid infrastructure delivery. It could 
gain considerable importance, should the idea of drawing a ‘programme 
plan for infrastructure’, including phasing and coordination, come to 
reality.
5. The strategic features of the London Infra-
structure Plan
As appears from the description above, the LIP 2050 and its by-prod-
ucts are still being developed. The interpretation of the plan that we pro-
pose as an attempt to provide a trading zone, a move characterised by 
an apparently strategic nature, is then partial and based on an ongoing 
process.
Figure 3: Energy supply and 
associated infrastructure 
(source MoL, 2015b).
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Creating a trading zone on infrastructure developments
The LIP 2050 has been launched as a plan aimed at sustaining the ongo-
ing development of London. Such an emphasis emerges not only from 
the contents of the plan, but also from a comparison with the current 
European frameworks for transport and energy issues. European strate-
gies address these fields with a trans-boundary attitude that is somehow 
assumed also by London, due to its position and ambitions as a global 
city. But the European focus on the pursuit of a sustainable future is 
absent in the case of the LIP 2050. London in fact clearly focuses on 
fostering its own development. This clear statement defines a space 
of engagement where different actors can coordinate with each other, 
moving from the assumption that their different views have a com-
mon interest in supporting the current development of the city. In this 
sense, the process apparently respects the criterion of inclusiveness and 
participation one could expect from the creation of a trading zone. The 
prospective work, followed by an apparently open consultation that en-
riched the plan, is now being translated into the creation of consultation 
and decision arenas.
Trading zones as planning tools, as discussed in above, emerge as 
areas providing opportunities for new understandings and exchanges 
between actors who can eventually reach partial agreements. The trad-
ing zone is a new construction, intended to provide a previously missing 
space for interactions involving different stakeholders and aiming at the 
construction of consensus, or at least bargaining, amongst them: it thus 
appears as an opportunity that has not been available in former forms 
of engagement. Considering the manifold stakeholders involved in the 
London infrastructures and their relationships, the space of interaction 
provided by LIP 2050 does not seem to fit in the definition of trading 
zone, because the actors involved in the process were arguably already 
interacting before the process.
The novelty brought by the irruption of London’s local authority in 
the sector would be the consultation of citizens, probably one of the 
strongest arguments for the downscaling of infrastructure planning and 
speeding up the devolution of power in that sector. Yet, this positive 
intention did not result into a very meaningful result, as stated by some 
critics and as emerges from the same planning process documents. On 
the one hand, “these opportunities have tended to attract a minority 
of active members of local communities which may have experience of 
community participation from previous initiatives” (Bailey, 2014, p. 14). 
On the other hand, limited were both the participation level and the ac-
tual impact that the conclusions of this consultation had over the behav-
iours of the sector’s actors, and even over the public binding decisions 
(such as planning and financing). For example, not only were the emerg-
ing remarks quite generic (see Steer Davies & Gleaves, 2015), but they 
did not influence a planning process that actually did not come to its 
planned conclusion. In a sense, citizens do not take part in the interac-
tions occurring inside the supposed trading zone of LIP 2050.5 A similar 
absence is noticed considering the connections with the London Plan 
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and GLA’s planning department, which appear to be scarce or even non-
existent. An illustration of this is the internet page dedicated to the con-
nection between LIP 2050 and planning issues, which remains strongly 
underdeveloped (see MoL, 2015c).
 
Positioning London and its local government as a player in the 
infrastructure debate
By creating space for engagement in the form of a trading zone, GLA 
is positioning itself for future discussions. It created an arena in which 
it emerges as a leading actor, first of all vis-à-vis the public bodies in 
charge (regulators, central state and boroughs), but also vis-à-vis the 
utilities company. The emergence of new technologies (such as decen-
tralised energy production) and the increased pressure resulting from 
climate change could very well turn the tables. In that case, the GLA 
would already be ready to assume leadership. The space for discussion 
provided by LIP 2050 in fact does not necessarily appear as a pure trad-
ing zone. While the trading zone should be a shared creation of different 
stakeholders (Mäntysalo & Balducci, 2013), it is the GLA that shapes 
the space of engagement related to the plan and assumes a guiding role. 
The univocal nature of LIP 2050 tends to suggest that stakeholders are 
brought in rather than actively participating to its construction. This as-
pect highlights the non-neutral nature that trading zones may assume, 
since they contribute to the individual strategies of specific actors: the 
actor promoting its establishment conditions the space for engagement 
they may provide. Moreover, its use within a wider strategy may give to 
a certain actor the role of initiator or director of a given interaction pro-
cess. This hypothetical strategic use of the trading zone reinstates their 
agonistic nature, not just for the interactions they may host (Mäntysalo 
et al., 2011), but also for their very nature as spaces of engagement. 
In the case of LIP 2050, the interest in a strategic use of trading zones 
can be explained considering that GLA still remains a ‘small fish’ when 
compared to utility companies such as Thames Water or EDF. Its influ-
ence over their business plans (if any) remains marginal and this situ-
ation will probably not evolve much in the coming years. To date, the 
central state is arguably the only public actor to have a say in medium to 
large-scale infrastructure developments (Marshall, 2014). Much has to 
be done before managing to effectively levelling the playing field. 
Advocate/lobby for increased resource devolution
Mayor Johnson’s infrastructure planning effort could finally be inter-
preted as another move for gaining devolution of powers and resources 
from central state. In a pattern similar to the one followed by his pre-
decessor Livingstone at the occasion of the Olympics (Newman, 2007), 
Mayor Johnson has been using long term planning to expand his in-
fluence over scattered competencies and claiming additional preroga-
tives (a process identified in other contexts by Pinson, 2009). This in-
terpretation locates the repositioning of London within a wider national 
dynamic, characterised by potential conflict between London and the 
National Government. Again, the creation of an area of engagement on 
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infrastructures becomes part of a political strategy intended to advocate 
for expanded local powers by reaffirming the central role of GLA in the 
development of London, as well as the centrality of the city in the na-
tional development. In the present case, it is quite remarkable that the 
chair of the London Finance Commission, Professor Travers, advocated 
for “a greater fiscal autonomy” of London both in the foreword of the 
document that would shape the whole reflection on infrastructure de-
velopment (London Finance Commission, 2013, p. 4). This autonomy 
could be more than a simply political target, since London may well use 
(if granted) this increased autonomy to solve climate-change related in-
frastructure issues; nonetheless, it does not appear as its primary objec-
tive in the process.
6. Concluding remarks
As per now, the LIP 2050 appears largely as Mayor Johnson’s tactical 
move to gain some additional resources and start positioning his admin-
istration for the future development in the field of infrastructures. Yet, 
should the ‘programme plan’ and the connections with the London Plan 
develop (which does not seem that likely in the near future), the present 
conclusions would have to be revisited. By interpreting the underlying 
planning process that led to the LIP 2050, we have been able to discuss 
the concept of trading zone, which seems to emerge from the approach of 
the plan. Actually, the enterprise of creating a new dialogue arena would 
then appear as a quite successful one in relation to the political state-
ments made by the Mayor of London, as exposed in the various reports 
that accompanied the development of the plan. As previously discussed, 
the space for engagement appears more as the construction of a single 
actor rather than as a shared effort of different stakeholders. Moreover, 
the use of this space of interaction is strategic, aiming to position GLA 
in a leading position within present and future processes concerning 
London’s infrastructures and its overall development, also in a nation-
wide perspective. On the contrary, the vision of the plan (“with the right 
infrastructure in place we can create a city where everyone’s quality of 
life improves”) seems to be a general and shared purpose, around which 
even subjects with different aims can define mutual agreements – one of 
the conditions required to establish a trading zone. 
Actors using the establishment of trading zones as a strategic move 
to position themselves within planning processes seem to question the 
original definition of a space intended as “an area of understanding, ex-
change and translation between actors to produce partial agreements 
and innovations” (Balducci, 2015, p. 6). In the light of the London ex-
perience in the field of infrastructures, the value of trading zones is not 
questioned, but rather their potential strategic meanings and uses are 
highlighted. The trading zone does not represent a neutral construc-
tion helping interactions, but could also have a strategic use, serving the 
purposes of specific subjects; for example, in this way the initiator may 
also acquire a more prominent position within the same space intended 
for engagement, when defining long-term visions or tackling specific 
planning issues. In this sense, we should bear in mind Kanninen, Bäck-
european journal of spatial development  |  no 64  |  july 201719
lund and Mäntysalo’s warning (2013, p. 174): “when the analytical re-
search tool is turned into a normative planning tool, we are tempted 
to do in normatively orientated planning research, we may lose sight 
of the deeper political ambiguities involved in planning and, related to 
this, sensitivity to local circumstances”. Successful local case analyses 
of politically less contested trading zones in planning may be taken as 
normative and generalised models for future planning processes, thus 
misusing the concept. Thereby, we could end up offering planning tools 
and recipes that unwittingly carry characteristics of political domina-
tion, ‘technicising’ some of the political ambiguities and turning certain 
local peculiarities into default prescriptions for planning platforms. 
In studying the LIP 2050, we have precisely tried to avoid this trap 
and highlight the political and strategical agendas that were operating 
behind a process that looked like a state-of-the-art trading zone con-
struction. Our initial conclusions could however be re-examined con-
sidering the effective outcomes of a given planning process, in order to 
observe if the attempted strategic use of the trading zone effectively in-
fluence also the final results. If the conclusions on the LIP case are not 
definitive, the use of the trading zone concept may be helpful for analys-
ing other experiences and may provide richer theoretical and operation-
al understandings of trading zones, also contributing to deconstructing 
their strategic and political hidden contents. This could contribute to 
help tackling what too often remains a blind spot in the analysis of tech-
nical planning tools. 
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Endnotes
1 London seems to have peculiar approaches to strategic infrastructural issues, which 
apparently resists the ‘homogenisation’ of national spatial strategies favoured by com-
munitarian planning frameworks (Jensen & Richardson, 2004).
2 The campaign against the third runway has been strongly supported by the Borough 
of Richmond (London Borough of Richmond upon Thames, 2015). The recent deci-
sion to expand the airport has caused the resignation of Zach Goldsmith, former Tory 
mayoral candidate for London and MP for the Richmond constituency (Siddique & 
Phipps, 2016). 
3 For example, in the field of energy (electricity) UK Power Networks is handling dis-
tribution in South East UK, but it stays connected to the national grid, while a variety 
of market operators are involved in the production and sale of energy; instead, as far 
as water is concerned, London is covered by four different companies, while the main 
infrastructures (e.g. the Thames Water Ring Main) are placed under the responsibility 
of Thames Water, definitely the main player in the sector.
4  For a deeper analysis and a comparison with other contemporary metropolitan spatial 
plans in Europe see Elinbaum & Galland (2016).
5  Recent contributions regarding actual practices and policy on citizens’ activation in 
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local services development are given by Wills (2016), and Tricarico (2015; 2016).
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